This paper deals with logic programs containing two kinds of negation: negation as failure and explicit negation. This allows two di erent forms of reasoning in the presence of incomplete information. Such programs have been introduced by Gelfond and Lifschitz and called extended programs. We provide them with a logical semantics in the style of Kunen, based on Belnap's four-valued logic, and an answer sets' semantics that is shown to be equivalent to that of Gelfond and Lifschitz.
INTRODUCTION
One of the striking features of logic programming is that it naturally supports non-monotonic reasoning by means of negative literals. Simply inferring negative information from a positive program is already a form of non-monotonic inference that shows essential di erences between the two main approaches to the model-theoretic semantics of logic programs: namely the standard model approach and the program's completion approach. same predicate are read as a de nition of the predicate using an equivalence connective in place of implications. Then :A must be inferred if :A is a logical consequence of the completion of the program.
From a programming language point of view, the standard model approach is not viable because it is untractable, namely the set of false atoms is not recursively enumerable. From a knowledge representation point of view however, standard models correspond naturally to the intended semantics of programs. Therefore the challenge is to provide constructs that capture the essential aspects of standard models, in a recursively enumerable setting. In the framework of normal programs which allow negation inside program clause bodies, the stable models of 12] provide a general notion of standard model. Stable models however may not exist or may not be unique. Strati ed and perfect models 3], are particular cases of stable models uniquely de ned for restricted classes of normal programs. Three-valued standard models have also been de ned to resolve the di culty of existence and uniqueness of a standard model for normal programs. None of these notions of standard model for normal programs however is computable so any concrete operational semantics is necessarily incomplete. On the other hand, the completion of a normal program may be inconsistent, e.g. with P = fp :? :pg, P = fp $ :pg, in which case any literal should be inferred. In order to resolve these di culties, Kunen proposed to take the set of the consequences in three-valued logic of the program's completion as the declarative semantics of the program. In the previous example, taking the third truth value u for p provides a model of P as u $ :u. Kunen proved a completeness result 18] for the negation as failure rule w.r.t. the three-valued completion of the program, followed by stronger completeness results for the constructive negation rule 19, 7] .
In this paper we study extended logic programs as introduced by Gelfond and Lifschitz 13,14] (see also 21,1]) to deal with two kinds of negation: explicit negation allowed in clause heads and bodies and negation by failure allowed in clause bodies only. These two negations allow two di erent forms of reasoning in the presence of incomplete information: to infer not A, you may want to know that A cannot be inferred (it is the case of negation by failure =A), or you may require an explicit inference process for not A, when e.g. the closed world assumption cannot be made on A (it is the case of explicit negation :A).
We study the existence of 4-valued Belnap's models for extended programs and develop a 9-valued Kunen-style semantics for extended programs. Because the negation as failure connective is not monotonic w.r.t. the knowledge ordering, our construction is not an instance of the bilattice extension of logic programming proposed by Fitting in 10], it corresponds rather to an extension of this framework to incorporate negation as failure: our 3 3 construction extends Fitting's programs on the 2 2 bilattice of Belnap's logic, in the same way as programs with negation as failure (provided with 3-valued semantics) extend positive (2-valued) programs. Furthermore we show that the answer sets of 14] correspond to a notion of standard 4-valued Belnap's models, and we suggest with examples that our computable semantics captures essential aspects of the answer set semantics for extended programs.
PRELIMINARIES ON EXTENDED LOGIC PROGRAMS
Closed World Assumption.
When the closed world assumption is not applicable, i.e. when dealing with possibly incomplete or inconsistent information, the deduction process of the falsity of a sentence A should be independent from that of the truth of A. Such a deduction process should then be able to infer negative information in another way than does the usual negation as failure, namely it should be able to infer \explicitly" negated information as well as positive one. In order to do this, one has to distinguish between two kinds of negation: explicit negation (denoted :) and negation as failure (denoted /). Not unexpectedly, : will be allowed to occur in the head of clauses, but not /.
Here is a short example borrowed from 14]. A College uses the following rules for awarding scholarships to its students: (i) Every student with a GPA of at least 3.8 is eligible.
(ii) Every minority student with a GPA of at least 3.6 is eligible. (iii) No student with the GPA under 3.6 is eligible. (iv) The students whose eligibility is not determined by these rules are interviewed by the scholarship committee.
Assume this program is used in conjunction with a database containing the following fact about one of the students: Ann's GPA is 3.7.
The database contains no information about minority(ann), whereas Ann is a minority student, but declined to state this fact on her application, as a matter of principle. Representing such a knowledge in a logic programming language requires thus two kinds of negation: an explicit negation, which may occur in the head of clauses (rule 3) and negation by failure (rule 4). denotes the relation of dependance among predicates through an even number (including 0) of / (resp. an odd number of /).
These relations could have been de ned similarly on ground atoms instead of predicates. In the following de nitions, we use both forms (on predicates, on atoms), so for sake of clarity we explicitly mention which one is intended.
We say that P is call-consistent i we never have p ?1 p for any predicate symbol p, i.e. no predicate symbol or :-negated predicate symbol p is de ned negatively from itself.
Following 3] we say that an extended program P is strati ed i no predicate symbol or :-negated predicate symbol depends on itself through at least one / negation.
It is locally strati ed i no ground atom or ground :-negated atom depends on itself through at least one / negation.
Following 6] we say that an extended program P is positive order consistent (p.o.c.) i the relation w +1 on atoms has no in nite decreasing chain (it is in particular the case if all recursions are through one or more /).
If is a query, we say i p i either a i p for some atom a occurring positively in or a ?i p for some a occurring negatively in . An extended program P is said strict w.r.t. the query i for no predicate letter p do we have both +1 p and ?1 p.
BELNAP'S LOGIC In 4] Belnap introduced a four-valued logic intended to deal in a useful way with inconsistent or incomplete information (see also 2]).
A way to interpret Belnap's truth values is to think of them as sets of classical truth values: we write t for ftrueg, f for ffalseg, ? for ; (indicating a lack of information) and > for ftrue;falseg (indicating inconsistency). This set T of truth values has two natural orderings: one is the subset relation, a knowledge ordering k (the vertical ordering in Figure 1 ), and a truth ordering t (the horizontal one). In this way, inconsistency (>) and lack of information (?) cannot be distinguished according to the truth ordering. Each of these orderings provides the set of truth values with the structure of a lattice, so that the whole structure can be considered as the simplest non-trivial bilattice 16, 9] .
Meet and join under t are denoted^and _; they are generalizations of the usual conjunction and disjunction. Meet and join under k are denoted and , respectively consensus and gullability operators; but we shall not need them in our extended logic programs. On the other hand, there is a natural notion of negation :, which ips the diagram from left to right, switching f and t, leaving ? and > alone.
In 10] Fitting proposes an extension of logic programming to bilattices: to execute a bilattice logic program, you just compute the actual (truth) value v of the body of a clause and replace the value of the head by v. Since all connectives considered by Fitting are monotone w.r.t. k , this mechanism amounts to adding information to the fact base: your knowledge about the situation increases (but not necessarily following the truth ordering).
In this paper, we shall consider also connectives that are non-monotonic w.r.t. the knowledge ordering in order to model negation as failure. We shall consider the slash /, which ips the diagram from bottom-left to top-right, switching f and >, and t and ? 2 . In a four-valued logic it is very natural to introduce such a connective, moreover there is a need for it, to get a fully expressive set of connectives:
Complete Sets of Connectives.
In classical logic, the connectives :,^and _ form a complete set, i.e for every integer n, all the mappings from ff;tg n to ff;tg can be expressed by composition of some of the connectives. In fact, : and^su ce to form a complete set for classical logic.
When moving to Belnap's logic, the connectives : and^extending the corresponding classical ones do not form a complete set. Precisely: if K n are sets of mappings from ff;t;?;>g n to ff;t;?;>g, and K = S K n , let us call K the intersection of all the sets S such that:
(i) S contains K, the 0-ary f, t, ?, >, and the k th n-ary projection k n for every integers n k 1,
(ii) if f 1 : : : f p are in S and all n-ary, and if is in K and p-ary, then < f 1 :::f p > is in S and is n-ary.
We say that the set K is complete for T if K contains all the mappings from ff;t;?;>g n to ff;t;?;>g, for every integer n. Proposition Now let f be a (n + 1)-ary function. We de ne the n-ary functions g, h, k, l by:
f(x 1 :::x n ; f) = g(x 1 :::x n ) f(x 1 :::x n ; t) = h(x 1 :::x n ) f(x 1 :::x n ; ?) = k(x 1 :::x n ) f(x 1 :::x n ; >) = l(x 1 :::x n ) If (?t) is the unary function that lets t invariant and maps the other truth values to f, then we have: f(x 1 :::x n+1 ) = (?t)(:x n+1 )^g(x 1 :::x n )]_ (?t)x n+1ĥ (x 1 :::x n )] _ (?t)(=x n+1 )^k(x 1 :::x n )] _ (?t)(nx n+1 )^l(x 1 :::x n )].
But (?t)x = x^?x. Hence f can be expressed in K 0 , and the result is proved for any integer n.
4 9-VALUED KUNEN-STYLE SEMANTICS VIA BELNAP'S LOGIC
In the usual case (programs without explicit negation :), the semantics is 3-valued, and this corresponds to the three possible situations for a ground query:`yes' answer (true), nite failure (false) and looping (unde ned).
In the case of programs with both negations, the answers concerning the truth and falsity of a query are completely independant. So the truth value assigned to a formula A will be a couple of classical truth values (true, false, unde ned), the 1 st element of this couple corresponding to the knowledge about the truth of A, and the 2 nd one corresponding to the knowledge about its falsity. Hence logic programs with both negations will be provided with a 9-valued Kunenstyle semantics. (i) for every n-ary function symbol f, A(f) : A n ! A is a n-ary function, (ii) for every n-ary predicate symbol p other than =, A(p) is a mapping from A n to the set of 9 truth values; A(=) is always true identity, i.e., A(=)(a;b)
is t i a and b are the same object and f otherwise.
A 4-valued structure is simply a 9-valued structure in which, for every predicate p, neither 1 (A(p)) nor 2 (A(p)) takes the value u. As usual, the interpretation is extended to formulas according to the 9-valued truth tables (de ned above componentwise); for the quanti ers, we de ne obviously A(9X ) = W a2A A( (a)) and A(8X ) = V a2A A( (a)). We say that the 9-valued structure A is a model of the completed program P ? , denoted A j = 9 P ? , i all formulas in P ? have truth value t in A. If A is in fact a 4-valued structure, then we write A j = 4 P ? . Extensions.
Let < k be the ordering on f0;u;1g such that u < k 0 and u < k 1. If A and B are two 9-valued structures, we shall say that B is an extension of A i A and B have the same domain of interpretation and agree on the interpretations of all function symbols, and for each ground atomic formula , 1 (A( )) k 1 (B( )) and 2 (A( )) k 2 (B( )). The natural ordering between extensions is induced by the ordering k de ned component-wise on the 9 truth values from k (see Figure 3) .
Intuitively, an extension of A is \less unde ned" than A. It is a concept di erent from that of \expansion" (see 18]) and more natural in our context, but Kunen's proofs of interest for us can be easily adapted to the notion of extension.
To see this, let us return temporarily to the classical setting and recall the de nition of an expansion: if P and Q are sets of predicate symbols, P Q, M is a 3-valued P-structure (i.e. a structure that interprets only predicate symbols in P) and N a 3-valued Q-structure, then N is called an expansion of M if M and N have the same domain and agree on the interpretations of all function symbols and predicate symbols in P. Let us de ne an extension of a classical 3-valued structure M to be a 3-valued structure N such that for every formula , M( ) k N( ). If P is a set of predicate symbols and M is a 3-valued P-structure, let M P denote the structure such that M P (p) = M(p) if p 2 P else M P (p) = u. Then the following (trivial) proposition establishes the connection between expansions and extensions.
Proposition 3 Let M be a 3-valued P-structure and N a 3-valued Q-structure, with P Q. N Q is an extension of M P i N is an expansion of M.
This shows that expansions and extensions are about the same notion (for instance: Kunen's immediate consequence operator maps each 3-valued structure to an \extension" of it; besides if M is a 3-valued Q-structure and S a signing for P Q, then 2val(M; S) Q is an \extension" of M Q ; etc.). Immediate consequence operator.
Given an extended program P, we de ne an operator T P which maps each 9-valued structure to an extension of it. Let A be a 9-valued structure, p a n-ary predicate and a 1 : : :a n 2 A. The domain of T P (A) equals that of A; T P (A) and A agree on the interpretations of all function symbols. For predicate symbols, let v = T P (A)(p)(a 1 :::a n ) be de ned by: One veri es easily that T P (A) is indeed an extension of A. Theorem 4 Let A be a 9-valued structure. T P (A) = A i A j = 9 P ? : the xed points of T P are exactly the 9-valued models of P ? .
Conversion to 4-valued structures.
Since T P is monotone (w.r.t. the well-founded ordering k induced on 9-valued structures), it has a xed point (see 8]), hence P ? always has a 9-valued model. More speci cally, as in the classical case, we would like to know when P ? has in fact a 4-valued model. This is given by the condition of call-consistency introduced in Section 2:
Theorem 5 If P is call-consistent and A j = 9 P ? , then A has a 4-valued extension B such that B j = 4 P ? . As a consequence, if P is call-consistent, then P ? has a 4-valued model.
Theorem 6 Suppose P is call-consistent and strict w.r.t. a query . Then is a 4-valued consequence of P ? i it is a 9-valued consequence of P ? .
This means that our extended programs are to Fitting's programs on Belnap's logic, what programs with negation as failure are to positive programs.
In the next Section, we give proofs of these theorems through a \faithful" translation from extended programs to normal programs (such a translation has already been used by Gelfond and Lifschitz in 14].
REDUCTION TO NORMAL PROGRAMS
Let L be a xed rst-order language. We build a new rst-order language L : by adding to L, for each predicate symbol p, a new predicate symbol p 0 . Let L be a classical literal built on the language L: if L is an atomic formula, then let L : be L; if L = :p(a 1 :::a n ), then L : = p 0 (a 1 :::a n ). (Note that in ::a n ))) k 1 (B(p(a 1 :::a n ))) and 2 (A(p(a 1 :::a n ))) k 2 (B(p(a 1 :::a n ))) (for^, : and / are monotone w.r.t. k ) () for every n-ary predicate symbol p and each a 1 : : : a n 2 A = B, A : (p(a 1 :::a n )) k B : (p(a 1 :::a n )) and A : (p 0 (a 1 :::a n )) k B : (p 0 (a 1 :::a n )) () for every ground formula , A : ( ) k B : ( ) (for^and : are monotone w.r.t. k ) () B : is an extension of A : ;
(iv) follows from the de nition of T P and the remark that 2 (T P (A)(p)(a 1 :::a n )) = 1 (T P (A)(:p)(a 1 :::a n )); (v): one can prove easily by induction that for every ground formula such that : occurs only in front of atomic formulas, we have A : ( : ) = 1 (A( )). Now, for any completed de nition 8X 1 8X n (p(X 1 ; :::; X n ) $ in P ? , we have: A j = 9 p $ () 1 Example.
The rules in the example of Section 2 can be encoded in the following extended program P: : highGPA(ann):
Our Kunen-style semantics (weaker than the answer sets' semantics) su ces to deduce the expected assertion interview(ann), i.e. interview(ann) is a 9-valued consequence of the completed program. Note that by Theorem 6, the 4-valued consequences and 9-valued consequences of P ? are identical, since P is call-consistent and strict w.r.t. interview(ann).
CONNECTION WITH THE ANSWER SETS' SEMANTICS
In this Section we de ne answer sets for our extended programs, which are obtained from those of { removing all slashed literals from all other ground rules instances.
Now de ne an answer set of an extended program P to be a solution S to the equation S = (P S ). Proof: let S be an answer set of P, i.e. S = (P S ), a 1 : : : a n be Herbrand terms, and 8X 1 8X n (L(X 1 ; :::; X n ) $ be any completed de nition in P ? . We have to prove that 1 (m(S)( )) = 1 (m(S)(L)(a 1 ; :::; a n )).
{ If 1 (m(S)(L)(a 1 ; :::; a n )) = 1 then L(a 1 ; :::; a n ) 2 S; because of the definition of , there must be a ground rule instance R S : L(a 1 ; :::; a n ) :
? L 1 ; : : :; L k in P S such that L 1 ; : : :; L k 2 S. This rule comes from a rule R = (L :? L 1 ; : : :; L k ; =L k+1 ; : : : =L n ) in P, and therefore L k+1 ; : : :; L n = 2 S. Thus 1 (m(S)(L 1 )) = = 1 (m(S)(L k )) = 1 (m(S)(=L k+1 )) = = 1 (m(S)(=L n )) = 1, and = _9(L 1^ ^L k^= L k+1^ ^=L n ). Hence 1 (m(S)( )) = 1. { If 1 (m(S)(L)(a 1 ; :::; a n )) = 0 then L(a 1 ; :::; a n ) = 2 S; for all ground rule instance R S in P S of the form (L(a 1 ; :::; a n ) : ? L 1 ; : : :; L k ), one of the L 1 ; : : :; L k does not belong to S, say L i , so that 1 (m(S)(L i )) = 0 and hence 1 (m(S)( )) = 0. { 1 (m(S)(L)(a 1 ; :::; a n )) = u never happens.
2
Thus our answer sets can be identi ed with models in Belnap's logic. Besides the well-known results about answer sets' semantics for normal programs extend easily to our setting; we just sketch 3 theorems (for the de nitions see Section 2): Theorem 9 ( 6]) If P is a call-consistent extended program, then P has an answer set.
Theorem 10 ( 12]) If P is a locally strati ed extended program, then P has exactly one answer set.
Theorem 11 ( 6] ) If P is a p.o.c. extended program, then the answer sets of P coincide with the 4-valued Herbrand models of P ? .
CONCLUSION
The contribution of this paper is twofold:
(i) From the viewpoint of Fitting's programs on bilattices, we extend the programs on (the bilattice of) Belnap's logic by the addition of a nonmonotonic operator /, and we show that this notion of extended programs corresponds to the one of Gelfond and Lifschitz. (ii) From the viewpoint of the extended programs of Gelfond and Lifschitz, we provide them with a logical semantics in the style of Kunen, and we show that the underlying logic is precisely Belnap's logic.
